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Abstract 
Today, the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is widely used as the primary signaling protocol for multimedia 
communications over the Internet. It is also considered as the basic protocol of IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) of Next 
Generation Network architectures. However, security devices such as firewalls and NATs (Network Address Translation) 
prevent their traversal for SIP protocol. This issue has prompted several research works that led to a multitude of solutions 
such as NATFW NSLP. Nevertheless, the approach adopted by the latter weakens the NATs and firewalls from security 
point of view. Therefore, to prevent unauthenticated users and unauthorized access, authentication and authorization 
mechanisms should be included in this protocol. In this work, we proposed the HMAC authentication mechanism that we 
have integrated in NATFW NSLP protocol, and with a test platform, we evaluated its performance metrics. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent advances in telecommunications have enabled the convergence of different heterogeneous networks 
of mobile and fixed nature. The IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) architecture is a standardized Next Generation 
Network [1], which allows to unify access to multiple technologies and equipment-based IP. IMS enabled the 
convergence and the integration of data and multimedia services like voice over IP, video, presence, instant 
messaging and so on. Multiple protocols are used with IMS but the main one is SIP which is considered as the 
key protocol [2]. This standard protocol described in RFC3261, provides the establishment, modification and 
termination of sessions in a peer to peer and client/server architecture. 
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However, security devices such as firewalls and NATs prevent their traversal for SIP and they are not 
suitable for its operation. This problem has attracted several research works that led to a multitude of solutions: 
SIP extension or modification, NAT modification, methods for NAT behaviour discovery...etc. Indeed, several 
approaches have been proposed such as STUN, TURN, ICE, ALG, UPnP, SBC [3] etc ...However, because of 
the problem complexity, the variety of existing network topologies, and the behaviour of the NAT itself, none 
of these approaches fits in all situations and different operation cases. In addition, some of these solutions add 
bandwidth costs, increase latency, and are detrimental to the real-time application performance. Others, UPnP 
in particular, are stripped of all security protection. 
On the other hand, the NATFW NSLP protocol of the NSIS framework is considered the most promising, it 
is characterized by its robustness against different types of NATs, its effectiveness and ability to facilitate the 
traversal of a chain of NATs, all of these with good performance. Therefore, it is more advantageous than other 
proposed solutions. The basic concept of this protocol is to dynamically configure NATs by performing NAT 
binding and opening pinholes on firewalls. This rather delicate operation, undermines the main purpose of 
these devices and carries a risk from security point of view, this challenge must be taken into account in order 
to prevent unauthenticated users and unauthorized admission. Hence, to overcome this situation, an 
authentication and authorization mechanism must be supported by this protocol. In this work, we propose the 
efficient authentication mechanism HMAC which is a cryptographic hash function that allows to provide a 
MAC used by NATs and firewalls to ensure the authenticity of legitimate users requests. 
The paper is structured as follows: first, in Section II, we explain the NAT/FW traversal problem for SIP, 
then we give a brief overview of the NSIS architecture and NATFW NSLP protocol. We describe related works 
in Section III, before our approach is presented in Section IV. Our performance evaluation is given in Section 
V, before the paper is concluded in Section VI. 
2. Background 
2.1. NAT/Firewall traversal problem for SIP 
The Network Address Translation (NAT) technique represents a real problem for SIP: First, it does not allow 
incoming calls from the public side to recipients in the private network. Second, NATs work above the IP layer, 
the private IP addresses contained in SIP messages are not modified by NATs. Therefore, the callee rejects the 
SIP messages [3].As for firewalls, they reject all packets that are not destined to a known address/port, these 
policies prevent the passage of SIP and RTP incoming data stream (determined by SIP) that trades at the 
session establishment unknown port numbers for the firewall [3]. 
However, the IETF working group has developed a very promising and cost-effective solution called 
NATFW NSLP, this protocol is one of the NSIS applications which can be easily used in IMS [4], since it 
requires no modification of the IMS architecture and the NATFW NSLP signaling occurs only between the 
Users Agent and NATs/firewalls. 
2.2. NSIS framework and NATFW NSLP protocol 
The NSIS framework was primarily designed to overcome the limitations of RSVP and respond to the 
explosion of networks size. In order to support signaling in different contexts (QoS, NAT traversal), this 
framework has been implemented in two layers architecture (Fig 1): 
 The NSLP (NSIS Signaling Layer Protocol), a top layer designed to hold signaling applications such as QoS 
NSLP [5] and NATFW NSLP [6]. 
 The NTLP (NSIS Transport Layer Protocol): its role is to transport NSLP messages between adjacent NSIS 
nodes using GIST (General Internet Signaling Transport) protocol [7].  
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Fig. 1. NSIS architecture 
The main purpose of the NATFW NSLP signalling is to enable communication between two nodes 
belonging to different networks in the presence of NATs and firewalls. Its basic principle consists in 
dynamically installing additional rules in all intermediaries NATs and firewalls. It is assumed that the NI (NSIS 
Initiator), NR (NSIS Responder) and each intermediate NF (NSIS Forwarder) support the NATFW NSLP 
protocol. The NATFW NSLP messages are created and sent by the NI, handled by the NFs and finally 
processed by the NR; the NI generates the CREATE message and sends it to the NR, each NF (running 
NATFW NSLP) on the way handles the message as it can also rejects it according to its local rules. When the 
message reaches the NR and accepted, the NR creates a response message and sends it to the NI on the same 
path (Fig 2.a). If the data receiver DR is behind a NAT or firewall, and may need to receive data stream from 
the outside, the problem is more restrictive. Indeed, the NSIS signaling messages and subsequent data flows 
sent to a particular destination IP address that must be known in advance and accessible. DRs should inform 
firewall and NAT on incoming signaling messages and data flow prior to receipt by the latters. The NATFW 
NSLP solves this problem by using the EXTERNAL message sent by the DR to edge-NAT to reserve a public 
address/port and allow the following stream to reach it (Fig 2.b).  
 
Fig. 2. (a) Session creation; (b) Reservation message flow 
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The rather delicate NATFW NSLP operation which consists in opening pinholes on firewall and performs 
NAT binding, undermines the main purpose of these devices and carries a risk from authentication point of 
view to prevent unauthorized access. In order to manage critical resources (such as the opening of pinholes on 
firewall), GIST protocol does not have appropriate mechanisms to verify the identity of a given host 
(authentication), if authorized to use a particular service (authorization), and finally starting its credit once it 
actually uses this service (Accounting) [8], [9]. Security within NSIS is therefore limited to already existing 
channel security mechanisms like TLS or IPsec as provided by the NTLP layer. However, TLS at GIST level 
between nodes is not appropriate, since this protection is not related to sessions and the user level. That is, 
security of NSIS is insufficient for secure authorization of NAT binding or firewall pinhole. Therefore, our 
work revolves around a double goal, firstly to propose an authentication and authorization mechanism allowing 
the NAT/FW to do not accept a message that is not authenticated, nor perform the action it has requested. 
Secondly, the proposed solution must maintain the performance of NATFW NSLP and SIP signaling protocols. 
3. Related works 
Most works in this context, was intended for QoS NSLP application; however, some of them can be applied 
to NATFW NSLP. In some cases [10], a special authorization application was defined and a public key 
encryption is used for authentication, these two approaches are heavy due to the backend communication with 
policy server and encryption type used for authentication. In addition, the message NSLP is not included in 
these checks for authenticity. In [11] a session-oriented mechanism, based on NTLP hops, was proposed using 
a temporary public/private key pair with Diffie Hellman as the key exchange method. This approach is heavy 
and less scalable because of its orientation and signatures based on public key cryptography. In [9], an HMAC 
mechanism is used with a Kerberos server that generates a token to send to the NI to provide the private key, 
this token is then sent by the NI to the NAT/FW in the message by creating two authorization objects. This 
approach increases the message size, but the major drawback is the key that is included in the NSLP messages, 
so an attacker can intercept the message and disclosure the key. In [8] the authors defines an object (called 
SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT) that is inserted into the NSLP message and controlled by the respective network 
elements. It contains a list of fields, with other attributes, which describe the session and can be used to check 
the validity of the request. Its header follows the generic NSLP object header. Figure 3.a shows its general 
format which contains the fields :  (1) Type: SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT. (2) Length: the length of the object. 
(3) Session Authorization Attribute List: This field is of variable length, the list of attributes authorization 
session is a collection of objects that describe the session. A session authorization attribute can contain a 
variety of information, it has a type and a subtype. Figure 3.b shows the general format of the attributes: 
 
Fig. 3. (a) SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT header; (b) Common session authorization attribute format 
(1) Length: the length of the attribute. (2) X-Type: the attribute type. (3) SubType: designation depends on the 
field X-Type, where each X-Type has specific subtypes. (4) Value: contains specific attribute information that 
depends on the previous fields X-Type and SubType. 
The basic concept of the session authorization defined in RFC5981 is shown in Figure 4. The AE is 
responsible for authenticating the NI and providing it a PE, so that it can generate its request, whereas the PDP 
role is to verify the request received from the NAT/FW and then take a decision. 
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Fig. 4. RFC5981 architecture components 
4. Analysis and design 
4.1. Adopted mechanism 
Among the available authentication mechanisms that are mentioned in [8], we were interested in HMAC 
mechanism, this choice is justified by the constraints of the VoIP flow and SIP signaling protocol that require a 
short time for sessions establishment. Provide for the NATFW NSLP protocol a lightweight and fast 
authentication mechanism would be more advantageous and suitable for this type of communications. 
4.2. Authorization object format with HMAC mechanism 
In this case, the SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT must contain the following attributes: (1) SOURCE_ADDR: 
the source address of the entity that created the object; it correlates the authorization object with the 
corresponding NSLP message. (2) START_TIME: this is the timestamp wherein the hash (MAC) was 
calculated; it must be different in the two messages in sequence to prevent replay attacks. (3) 
NSLP_OBJECT_LIST: it lists all NSLP objects included in the MAC calculation (as well as GIST 
SESSION_ID, NSLPID, and MRI). (4) AUTHENTICATION_DATA: it contains the key ID used in the 
calculation as well as the MAC. Figure 5.a shows the complete format of a SESSION_AUTH_OBJECT used 
with the HMAC mechanism. 
4.3. Proposed architecture 
To avoid additional backend communication, in each message generation, between the NI and the AE, from 
one side, and between the NAT/FW and the PDP on the other side (see fig 4), the following requirement must 
be asked: the NI assumes the generation of the authorization object and the entire request, whereas the 
NAT/FW is responsible for verification, authentication and authorization without the need to call a third party. 
In addition they must share a key to hash their messages with HMAC. This key is referenced in the 
authorization object by KEY_ID in the AUTHENTICATION_DATA attribute. The key management method 
the most appropriate for NATFW NSLP protocol is where a server is responsible for distributing shared keys 
between NATFW NSLP nodes. In addition, this architecture is the most recommended by security researchers, 
and was adopted in several security protocols for the management of symmetric keys [12]. Therefore, we 
proposed the use of Diameter server that provides the basic mechanisms to establish a reliable transportation.  
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Fig. 5. (a) Session authorization object format in case of HMAC; (b) Proposed architecture 
In this architecture (Figure 5.b), we distinguish: (1) The NI: which generates the authorization object and the 
NAT binding/opening pinhole request. (2) The NAT/FW (NF): the request receiver, it authenticates, authorizes 
and executes the requested action. (3) The Diameter server: that handles the key distribution. 
4.4. Authentication procedure phases 
The authentication and authorization procedure executes in 3 phases: (1) The first phase is the distribution of 
the shared key which launched when the NI client (or the NAT/FW) sends a request to the Diameter server in 
order to get the key. This request must contain the necessary NI credentials for allowing the server to 
authenticate the client. The type of communication that we propose in these channels, between the server and 
clients, is based on an asymmetric approach (asymmetric encryption). This phase is only launched if the clients 
do not yet get the key or if the key validity is expired. (2) The second phase is the message and the 
authorization object generation, the NI calculates the MAC, inserts it  into the AUTHENTICATION_DATA 
attribute, inserts the authorization object at the end of the message, and finally sends the message to the 
NAT/FW. (3) The third phase is the message processing when received by the NAT/FW, the latter must first 
extracts the authorization object included, and checks its attributes, if any abnormality is found, it generates an 
error message, otherwise, it calculates the MAC using the HMAC algorithm and the shared key on the 
specified objects. This calculated MAC is compared with that received. Once the integrity, authenticity and 
validity of the service request has been verified, the NAT/FW should consult its authorization policy to 
determine if the specified request is authorized by checking that the requested service is not busy. 
5. Performance evaluation 
 
Fig. 6. Test platform 
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5.1. Test platform 
We used in the test platform (see Fig 6) standard PCs with the Linux system (Kernel 2.6.18), and the 
following characteristics: P4 CPU 3.6 GHz, Realtek RTL8169/8110 network card, 1GB DDRAM, 40 G hdd. 
The NAT/FW implementation on a PC is made by Netfilter. We chose the hash function SHA-1 to calculate 
the MAC of each message. We measured the same metrics as in [13] which are : Processing Time PT, Session 
Setup Time SST, CPU and memory consumption that we found as follows :(1) For SST and PT, timestamps are 
inserted directly into the source code, and with a simple script we calculate the time between two timestamps 
corresponding to a session. (2) A script was used to monitor the CPU and memory consumption. 
5.2. Results and discussion 
A The tests are performed using the "NatFwClient" test application which runs on the NI and creates a new 
NATFW NSLP session every a quarter of second by launching a CREATE request with different ports. We 
subtracted the processing and setup time of Iptables rules in all tests, since Netfilter is not our interest here. 
Processing time: The processing time was measured on the NF, figure 7.a illustrates the tests results of the 
processing time of the protocol with HMAC which increases slowly and amounts to nearly 56 ms for 50,000 
sessions, the growth rate between the two protocol casesis18% for 50,000 sessions. This maximum of 
established sessions in the tests is due to Netfilter (responsible of bottleneck). 
  
Fig. 7. (a) NF Processing Time; (b) Session Setup Time 
Session Setup Time: The second reading performance is dedicated to NATFW NSLP session setup time, 
which represents the time required to establish a session between the NI and NR. Figure 7.b shows the results 
observed. The first observation is that the time is less than 220 ms for the maximum possible number of 
sessions; the session setup time increases gradually with a growth rate of almost 23% for 50,000 sessions. The 
small increased time for NATFW with HMAC compared to the basic one, as shown in figures 7.a and 7.b; is 
due to HMAC which is lightweight, fast and does not require a long time to be performed, despite the large 
established sessions number. 
CPU Consumption: In this case, we are interested in taking the CPU consumption. Figure 8.a shows the 
CPU load of the NF which increases more rapidly to over 20,000 sessions, but does not exceed a rate of 18% 
for the protocol with HMAC when the number of sessions reaches 50,000 with a difference between both cases 
(with and without HMAC) of 14%. Therefore, we can deduce that the protocol does not introduce large costs. 
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Fig. 8. (a) NF CPU consumption; (b) NF memory consumption 
Memory Consumption: The last statement is to measure the memory consumption. Figure 8.b presents the 
tests results of the memory usage on the NF, which in case of NATFW NSLP with HMAC increases slowly; 
we recorded a growth rate of 15% for 50,000 sessions. This result confirm that the NATFW NSLP protocol 
with HMAC has only a small influence on memory consumption compared to the case without HMAC. 
6. Conclusion 
The HMAC mechanism proposed in this work is characterized by the following advantages: (1) Simplicity.  
(2) A high efficiency. (3) Architecture and key management more appropriate. (4) Warranty of NSLP integrity 
messages and the authorization object itself. (5) Prevention of replay attacks. (6) Minimization of the object 
size. The results of the surveys showed that the NSLP NATFW with HMAC can handle a large number of 
sessions with very acceptable performance: a short Session Setup Time and a low CPU and memory 
consumption. However, this mechanism does not clearly ensures the confidentiality of NSLP messages, nor the 
non-repudiation. However, the messages confidentiality can be achieved by an encryption algorithm. Hence, as 
a future work, we are investigating another mechanism which can ensure authentication and associated with an 
encryption algorithm which also ensures message confidentiality of legitimate users. 
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